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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
Killing two birds with one stone 
The Russian justice system has shown itself to be "stern" -- Edmund Pope was 
sentenced for the full twenty years -- and Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
shown himself to be "compassionate." On 8 December, the presidential 
commission on pardons advised Putin to pardon the American after the 
conclusion of the required waiting period of one week. (INTERFAX, 1050 GMT, 8 
Dec 00; via lexis-nexis) Putin has said he plans to issue the pardon. 
 
Perestroika lives on 
The Russian power organs have been quite active of late, and a number of 
proposals have been made to render them more efficient. A bill on restoring a 
secret service superstructure, the State Security Ministry [which once had 
jurisdiction in fields other than army intelligence that are now covered by the 
Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, the General Staff 
Intelligence Branch (GRU), the Federal Agency for Governmental 
Communications and Information and the Federal Border Guards Service] failed 
in the Duma on 15 November. (IZVESTIA, 16 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) The 
Russian interior ministry, however, may become a stronger federal oversight 
agency since regional criminal police committees are being subordinated to the 
federal authorities. A further streamlining of the structure is underway as Federal 
Criminal Investigations Committee is being set up to replace the Main Directorate 
for Organized Crime, the Directorate of Security, the Directorate R (computer 
crimes) and the operational and detective departments. (ITAR-TASS, 27 Nov 00; 
via lexis-nexis; and KOMMERSANT-DAILY, 29 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis ) 
 
 2 
Some thoughts on crime 
As the end of the year comes closer, some Russian officials are considering the 
latest data on crime. While the overall crime rate fell by 3% (as reported by the 
interior ministry, 2,215,000 crimes were committed in Russia in the first nine 
months of 2000, as compared to 2,281,400 during the same period in 1999), it 
was still far greater than in earlier years (1,900,000 in 1998, 1,800,000 in 1997). 
In Moscow the crime rate rose rapidly -- by 40% over the past year. There is 
some concern about the rate of crimes committed by police officers, which has 
risen by 3.5 percent over the last year. Lieutenant General Vyacheslav Brycheev, 
head of the interior ministry's personnel department, reported at a ministry 
seminar that about 100,000 police officers were dismissed for "discrediting 
reasons," and that 98 interior troop officers had committed crimes since the 
beginning of the year, 10 of whom were dismissed. (ITAR-TASS, 28 Nov 00; via 
lexis-nexis; ITAR-TASS, 1124 GMT, 20 Oct 98; via lexis-nexis; and ITAR-TASS, 
6 Nov 97; via lexis-nexis) Increased drug use has been cited as a major threat to 
national security: If the current trend continues, there will be over 4 million drug 
users in Russia in the 21st century. The number of drug-related crimes has risen 
fourteen-fold over the last 10 years. (INTERFAX, 0852 GMT, 29 Nov 00; via 
lexis-nexis) In addition to rising crime rates, the number of deaths from alcoholic 
poisoning, suicide and car accidents has increased significantly. (AGENCE 
FRANCE PRESSE, 5 Dec 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
The Anti-terrorism Center: another dead CIS initiative? 
In one more demonstration of its divisions, the CIS concluded its final summit of 
the year with little fanfare and many failures. This time, CIS cooperative efforts 
were stymied (once again) by a lack of motivation evidenced by the ostensible 
failure of its most touted cooperative measure, the Anti-terrorism Center (ATC). 
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Despite rosy rhetoric from many member states -- most notably Russia -- the 
latest meeting only confirmed the moribund nature of the grouping's initiatives. 
The ATC may have held top billing at the 1 December CIS summit in Minsk, but 
long before the summit, the ATC was already showing signs of neglect. 
(ECONOMIC NEWS, 1 Dec 00; via lexis-nexis) Promoted in fall 1999 by then-
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the concept for an ATC has enjoyed widespread 
support among commonwealth members. At the September CIS summit in fact, 
the CIS presidents almost unanimously voted in favor of the new initiative's 
immediate implementation. However, like most other CIS initiatives, thus far the 
ATC has remained dead in the water. 
 
The frustration over this lack of motivation was evident in Minsk, especially as 
displayed by Central Asian states which currently are facing "terrorist" 
insurgencies on their southern borders. Kazakh President Nursultan Nazerbaev 
derided the lack of initiative among CIS members at the summit, pointing out that 
five months after their decision to implement the ATC, the members had not 
issued even a collective reaction to the "developments" in Central Asia. (ITAR-
TASS, 1548 GMT, 1 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1201, via World News Connection) 
Likewise, Azeri President Heydar Aliev expressed frustration tempered by his 
apparent understanding of bureaucratic politics when he stressed that there "is a 
desire and a need for cooperation," but that initiatives take time to implement. 
(INTERFAX, 0707 GMT, 2 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1202, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Putin, by contrast, painted the get-together as a success. Speaking for all 
participants, he claimed that they were "fully satisfied with the results of the 
summit which has produced important and positive results," in apparent 
reference to the ATC. (BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, 4 Dec 00; 
via lexis-nexis) However, the commonwealth's inability to make any headway 
belies Putin's attempt to inflate artificially the summit's results. 
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As it stands, even if the ATC is implemented in some limited form -- probably as 
a collective database of suspected and known "terrorist" organizations -- it will 
most likely join the ranks of other CIS-wide cooperative measures which have 
been largely ineffective. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has chalked up 
some of CIS ineffectiveness to the chaotic nature of the commonwealth. In a 
recent public address, he commented that, "There are so many unions within the 
CIS that it's damn confusing!" (INTERFAX, 1426 GMT, 17 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-1117, via World News Connection) 
 
However, even those initiatives that have been implemented usually enjoy only 
partial participation from CIS member states, in large part due to the polarization 
in the CIS between the "Russia-6" (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, 
Moldova). The split highlights the divergent interests between GUUAM members, 
which generally resist Russian dominance in the CIS, and the more pro-Russian 
axis, whose members accept Russian dominance in exchange for mutually 
advantageous relationships based on military and economic benefits. 
Certain recent actions by GUUAM members have only exacerbated this split -- in 
particular, GUUAM members' steps to institutionalize the association in the past 
few months and efforts to establish GUUAM as an independent international 
organization at the recent OSCE meeting and within the auspices of the UN. With 
economic gains hanging in the balance -- mostly Caspian oil and a planned 
transport corridor to Western Europe -- relations within the CIS most likely will 
suffer only further as GUUAM pursues its own economic and strategic interests. 
 
Yet another, perhaps less obvious, factor influencing the downturn in CIS 
momentum is reflected by its dominant member's relative preoccupation with 
matters outside the CIS. After Putin's rather bold moves to reassert Russian 
domination in the CIS over the first few months of 2000, Moscow's CIS initiative 
appears to have waned over the second half of 2000 as its attentions and 
energies turned elsewhere in the world. Thus, while Moscow has been pursuing 
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actively its foreign policy in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, it has done so at 
the expense of developing its relations with countries closer to home. This type of 
neglect only opens the door for groupings like GUUAM to seize the initiative. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
REGIONS 
Future of interregional associations discussed 
Since Putin created his federal regions, the continued existence of Russia's 
interregional associations is unclear. Originally established somewhat hurriedly in 
the face of the economic meltdown which followed Yel'tsin's devaluation of the 
ruble several years back, the interregional associations were seen by some as 
being potential counterweights to Moscow's centralizing tendencies. However, 
since Putin created his federal districts, headed by his appointees, it looks as if 
the role of the interregional associations to counter Moscow has lessened 
considerably. 
 
At the 10 November Omsk session of the Siberian Federal District Council, 
Aleksandr Nazarchuk, chair of the Altay Kray Legislative Assembly, proposed 
disbanding the Siberian Accord because he felt it had become redundant due to 
the existence of the federal regions. (The accord is one of the seven regional 
economic organizations which became increasingly important during the 
country's devaluation crisis in the 1990s.) He pointed out that many issues with 
which the Siberian Accord had previously dealt are now being considered at the 
sessions of the district councils, containing the region's governors, which advise 
the president's representative. There was no vote on the motion; thus, the matter 
has been left unresolved, although Putin's representative to the Siberian Federal 
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Region, Leonid Drachevsky, claimed that the Siberian Accord complemented the 
work being undertaken by the federal region and thus should remain. 
 
It seems somehow inevitable that the country's interregional associations either 
will be dissolved or will be merged into the federal regions. This probability is 
enhanced by the plan to hold joint sessions of the federal regions and 
interregional associations, at least in the Siberian area. (ROSSIYSKAYA 
GAZETA, 18 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1121, via World News Connection) 
The interregional associations' experiment in federalism seems to be coming to 
an end. Putin skillfully has placed a set of new organizations under his control 
within and among the regions which will allow him to manipulate Russian 
federalism in a way that suits him. 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Duma passes law on national symbols 
Having fretted that Russian athletes at the Olympic games in Sydney, Australia, 
had no words to their new national anthem and so could not sing along when 
standing on the gold medal winners' stand, the Duma has returned to the past by 
legalizing the old Soviet-era anthem put into place by Joseph Stalin in 1944. (Of 
course, it is unclear why words could not have been written to go with the new 
anthem.) Also legalized was the continued use of the tsarist-era tricolor flag and 
double-headed eagle as national seal which former President Yel'tsin put into 
place by decree. The Duma also agreed with Putin's desire to return the red 
banner as the flag for the Russian army. (ITAR-TASS, 1009 GMT, 8 Dec 00; 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
Putin argues that using both the Soviet and tsarist symbols represents a uniting 
of all of Russia's past. One wonders if personally he is not just a little nostalgic for 
a little taste of the past Soviet glory that he had a hand in propagating. But 
symbols are important, especially for those who suffered under them. A great red 
flag flying over Russian troops can serve only to antagonize those who were 
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once colonized and abused under it. The return of both the anthem and the army 
flag certainly do not suggest in and of itself the revival of the Soviet Union, 
anymore than the revival of the tricolor flag and the double-headed imperial eagle 
implies the resurrection of the Russian monarchy. But in both cases the new 
Russia, wobbly at the knees, is relying on past glory, either with crowns and 
cathedrals or workers triumphant, to legitimate its present existence. Perhaps 
this is to be expected. But Russia today needs to judge itself by its deeds rather 
than selective readings of its past. No number of Faberge eggs or busts of Lenin 
can justify the rape of Chechnya, abridgment of free speech, or the official 
flouting of inconvenient law. It is worth noting the degree of opposition Putin's 
move has created, from a newly vocal Yel'tsin, via Yabloko and SPS, to the 
brave democratic intelligentsia -- as always, Russia's conscience. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
Russian bomber training -- a hidden agenda? 
According to a Russian Air Force statement, Russia recently deployed seven 
long-range strategic bombers to bases in the Arctic for pilot training exercises. 
The propeller-driven Tu-95 Bear bombers, and the four accompanying Il-78 
tanker planes, have been sited at bases in Anadyr, Tiksi and Vorkuta. The Tu-95 
are nuclear weapons-capable aircraft, albeit of an older design and technology; 
placed at these bases close to the Arctic Ocean, they are within range of 
Canadian territory and Alaska. Canada has responded by positioning three CF-
18 fighters into the far northwestern territories to counter any Russian probing of 
the North American air defenses. 
 
Russian military statements have explained that training exercises are being 
resumed because fuel is now available. The last decade of reduced budgets had 
a devastating impact on military readiness. Russian officials pointed to the fact 
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that their bomber pilots average only 10 hours of flight training per year, 
compared to their Western counterparts, who traditionally fly 200 on average. A 
Russian spokesman denied Pentagon claims of an attempt to test American air 
defenses. He stated that these recent deployments were "not some saber-rattling 
in the Cold War style ... [and] the bombers aren't going to approach Alaska or 
pose any threat to the United States. They will stay in Russian airspace." 
(Jamestown Federation MONITOR, 5 Dec 00) 
 
With scarce funding vitally needed to help repair the decrepit state of the Russian 
armed forces, the question must be asked: Why train in this remote area when 
training at their permanent air bases would be less costly? The Russians have 
stated that their pilots needed additional experience in areas with "difficult 
meteorological conditions and strong geomagnetic fluctuations." (Jamestown 
Federation, MONITOR, 5 Dec 00) These conditions only exist in polar region 
flight. Confirming this new training focus, Colonel Aleksandr Drobyshevsky of the 
Russian Air Force's Main Staff told a correspondent that "Arctic flights will now 
become regular." (TURKISTAN BULLETIN, 0914 GMT, 7 Dec 00) Arctic flights to 
probe Western air defenses were common in the Cold War, and still are done 
periodically by both sides. But again, why in the post-Cold War world does this 
training need to become "regular"? The true answer probably lies in what Russia 
claims to be the biggest challenge to its strategic stability -- US fielding of a 
limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system. 
 
In recent weeks, various senior Russian officials have reiterated in strong terms 
their unwillingness to negotiate amendments to the 1972 ABM treaty. Moscow 
claims that pending US construction of the first NMD land-based radar site -- in 
Alaska -- is a violation of the ABM Treaty. Coupled with the ongoing, very public 
debate in America over the wisdom of this system, and a new American 
administration facing major NMD decisions, it is quite possible the Russians are 
not-so-subtly signaling the vulnerability (and therefore futility) of the proposed 
NMD deployment. Caught between aging nuclear forces they cannot afford to 
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maintain over the long-term and a potential US missile shield, this may be one of 
the few military options the Kremlin leadership believes it can exercise in 
response. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
The good, the bad ... and Gongadze 
Will December be a month of triumph for Ukraine? Or will it be a month 
consumed by suspicion, intrigue and the loss of respect? On 1 December it 
appeared almost certain that the answer would be the latter, as the country 
began to scrutinize Oleksandr Moroz's contention that President Leonid 
Kuchma's voice appeared on a tape ordering the murder of journalist Georgy 
Gongadze. For a few days -- perhaps a week -- it appeared that the Gongadze 
scandal might derail the budget process, interrupt negotiations to restructure the 
country's gas debt to Russia, have a negative impact on GUUAM talks, or slow 
reforms of the banking sector. But, instead, the mechanisms of government 
moved on unimpeded. In the face of this ugly crisis, important, necessary work 
was completed. In fact, in a span of only a few days, parliament moved the 
country closer both to a resumption of IMF loans and to the release of a World 
Bank financial sector tranche. 
 
First, on 7 December, parliament passed a much-anticipated banking law 
expected to increase the transparency of banking procedures. The law also 
removes a major obstacle to the release of a $100 million World Bank tranche to 
be used for financial sector restructuring. (REUTERS, 7 Dec 00; via America 
Online) While the country is by no means assured of receiving the tranche 
because of its unwillingness to comply with two World Bank conditions regarding 
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deposits and lending procedures, the new banking law drastically improves its 
chances. 
 
Even more important, just one day later, the legislative body easily approved the 
FY-2001 budget. The passage of this budget was achieved, for the first time, 
before the new year and eliminates the biggest hurdle to the resumption of IMF 
lending. Although IMF representatives have questioned the use of 5.9 billion 
hryvnyas ($1 billion) of anticipated privatization revenue to offset expenditures, 
they have called the budget relatively "realistic" and appear generally to approve 
of the document. Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, for his part, spoke glowingly 
of this achievement -- as well as of the success of the FY-2000 budget. The year 
2000, Yushchenko announced, will mark the first year that the country had a 
deficit-free state budget. After 11 months, in fact, there was a slight budget 
surplus. "For the first time," he said, "we have a fully executed state budget and 
have no problem with the payment of wages." (INTERFAX, 1152 GMT, 2 Dec 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1202; via World News Connection) 
 
These achievements took a good amount of pressure off the government, but 
President Kuchma's agreement to restructure the country's gas debt to Russia 
undoubtedly allowed everyone the biggest sigh of relief. The agreement will 
permit Ukraine to extend its payments over eight to eleven years. But most of all, 
it goes a long way toward limiting the creation of future debt to Russia by 
eliminating all purchases of Russian gas. Although Ukraine will be given 30 
billion cubic meters of gas per year by Russia as payment for use of the country's 
transit network, the rest of its gas needs will be met internally and by an 
agreement with Turkmenistan. Since Turkmenistan is requiring cash payments in 
advance each month, Ukraine finally may be learning to live within its means, at 
least regarding energy consumption. 
 
Add this to the government's reaffirmation to close Chernobyl on 15 December -- 
helped along by EBRD and EU approval of overdue loans to complete two new 
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reactors -- as well as the decision to tighten the ties between GUUAM countries, 
and December has been an excellent month for the Ukrainian government. 
This positive government activity came around the same time that President 
Kuchma appeared on television to suggest that individuals outside the country 
were behind Moroz's allegations regarding Gongadze. (REUTERS, 1328 GMT, 7 
Dec 00; via America Online) At an earlier meeting of CIS leaders, Kuchma, not 
surprisingly, had received unfettered support from Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze. Following his meeting with Shevardnadze, Kuchma suggested to 
reporters that "foreign special services" were pulling Moroz's strings. "We will 
have to find out which special services," Kuchma said. "Or guess," responded 
Shevardnadze. (INTERFAX, 0850 GMT, 1 Dec 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1201, via 
World News Connection) 
 
There is, of course, only speculation of the involvement of Russian or other 
intelligence services in the production of the Gongadze tapes. And certainly, the 
actions of the Ukrainian authorities are not helping Kuchma's cause. While more 
than a month has passed since the discovery of a headless body speculated to 
be Gongadze, little progress has been made on positively identifying the 
remains. The Kyiv Post recently commented that "officials from the Central 
Bureau of Forensic Expertise... were unavailable for comment. All four of their 
phones went unanswered. It was a similar story at all the law enforcement 
agencies that have been charged with investigating some aspect of the case. All 
refused comment and directed reporters to another agency." (KYIV 
POST/KPNEWS.COM, 7 Dec 00) 
 
So, while Kuchma claims foreign interference, he allows the internal investigation 
to appear at best bumbling and incompetent, and at worse, corrupt. 
Unfortunately, in a month when he should be ushering in a new era for Ukraine, 
touting the successful working relationship between the president and 
parliament, and earning praise for beginning to dig Ukraine out of the abyss into 
which it had fallen, his leadership on the Gongadze issue is questionable. It is 
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clear, then, that whether December is remembered as disastrous or triumphant 
will depend largely on Kuchma's actions. 
 
In his televised address, he suggested, "It is obvious that not everyone wants a 
sovereign Ukraine, confident in itself, its strengths and opportunities. Those who 
do not like this... are hurrying and do not stop at measures that are unacceptable 
from the political point of view and immoral from the human point of view." 
(UKRAINIAN TELEVISION, 1900 GMT, 6 Dec 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Will Kuchma open up the Gongadze investigation for 
the world to see or proceed as if democracy and rule of law applied in other 
cases only? Will he live up to his own words and justify the faith placed in him 
and his country by others? It appears that we will know by the new year. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: South Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
Georgia: 'A far off country, of which we know nothing' 
In recent days Russian officials have demanded loudly that Georgia "invite" 
Russian troops to conduct operations in northern districts bordering Chechnya. 
So far Georgian officials have rejected categorically such overtures. These 
operations would ostensibly target Chechen "terrorists" and "foreign 
mercenaries" who, the Kremlin claims, have fallback positions and training sites 
in the Akhmeta district of Georgia. However, over the course of the present war 
and the last war, the Russian armed forces have not shown the least inclination 
to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. If Georgia allows 
Russian troops to operate in the Pankisi Gorge, that would expose the local 
population to brutal punitive operations of the kind that has been documented 
amply by Human Rights Watch in three recent reports. (www.hrw.org) 
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The area is populated by Chechen Kists, natives of Georgia since time 
immemorial, who bear no relation to the war in Chechnya and deserve every 
protection of Georgian and international law. The area also hosts roughly 5,000 
refugees from Chechnya, to whom Georgian officials refer as "guests," as their 
tradition of hospitality dictates. According to humanitarian relief workers and UN 
Observer Mission in Georgia personnel, the overwhelming majority of these 
persons are refugees, although occasional criminal offenses, including 
abductions of foreign businessmen and international relief workers, have 
occurred. To his credit, President Eduard Shevardnadze has emphasized that 
Georgia has launched its own security operations in a limited way -- to bring 
about the release of hostages and the arrest of specific individuals -- and has 
sought to reassure persons of all ethnicities that they have nothing to fear from 
these actions. (IPRINDA, 0900 GMT, 6 DEC 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) Similarly, this August, when hostages were taken in 
the Pankisi Gorge, they were released by Georgian law enforcement officials with 
the help of the Chechen guests. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 23 Aug 00) 
 
The timing of the Russian pressure for joint operations and border control is 
curious. Why did the mountain passes become such a pressing problem in 
December? Could the traffic between Georgia and Chechnya be more 
problematic now, when the passes are covered in snow, than it was during the 
summer? Russian spokesmen ranging from Putin to Yazstrezhembsky and 
Manilov have turned up the pressure and subjected Georgia to an increasing and 
unremitting barrage of rhetoric since the failure of the November OSCE 
ministerial conference. On that occasion Russia vetoed a resolution which would 
have required it to fulfill the obligations it had made at the OSCE summit in 
Istanbul last year -- removal of Russian military bases from Moldova and Georgia 
tops the list. The next round of Russian-Georgian talks on the removal of 
Russian bases is due to be held 21-23 December. In his comments Deputy Chief 
of the General Staff Valery Manilov suggested that Russian troops would move 
north from Russian bases in Georgia to conduct operations in Akhmeta. (ORT, 
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1800 GMT, 8 Dec 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) This 
would give them a pretense to remain in Georgia beyond the limits set at the 
Istanbul conference. 
 
Similarly, on 5 December Russia imposed a visa regime on Georgia, making it 
the only CIS country subject to this treatment. The Russian-sponsored separatist 
regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are exempted from this punitive 
arrangement. This telling fact was not lost on the US state department, which, on 
7 December, in a very tepid and tentative way, managed to voice some concern 
about Russia's lack of evenhandedness. (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 5 Dec 00; 
via lexis-nexis) But the state department has kept mum on the much larger issue 
of Russian threats to extend the war beyond its confines into Georgia. The 
proposed visa arrangements imply that South Ossetia and Abkhazia effectively 
will be integrated into Russia and wrested away from Georgia. 
 
Over a year ago, US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott identified US 
interests with the containment of the Chechen war and the continued 
independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan. (FDCH POLITICAL TRANSCRIPTS, 
19 Oct 99; via lexis-nexis) It's high time to reiterate these ideas lest their 
omission be mistaken for their abrogation. Georgia may be "in Russia's 
backyard," but by the same token it is in Turkey's and NATO's garden. Aside 
from the strategic importance of Georgia and its potential as a base for 
destabilizing Turkey, there is another practical reason to let the Kremlin 
understand that incursions into neighboring states will precipitate severe 
penalties in relations with the US. Officials in the regional states are watching 
very carefully. If the US wishes to enjoy influence, or respect, in Baku, Tashkent, 
or Kyiv in the future, it has to speak up for Georgia now. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
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Iran and Turkmenistan: common position on Caspian Sea 
In a last-ditch effort to avert an agreement between Azerbaijan and Russia on the 
division of the Caspian Sea, Iran and Turkmenistan agreed to a common position 
on the Caspian's legal status. It is expected that, during his upcoming visit to 
Baku, President Putin and President Aliev will sign a bilateral agreement 
delimiting their sectors of the Caspian Sea. To thwart this possibility, government 
officials from Iran and Turkmenistan called for a summit of the littoral states to 
resolve the Caspian problem. 
 
Iran's special envoy on Caspian Sea affairs, Ali Ahani, met with Turkmenistan 
President Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan's capital, Ashgabat, on 27 
November to discuss the Caspian issue, as well as regional cooperation. Ahani 
emphasized that Iran and Turkmenistan share a common position on issues 
relating to the Caspian Sea. The Turkmen president agreed with Iran's position to 
divide the Caspian equally between the five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan) and expressed support for holding a 
summit. (IRNA, 1619 GMT, 27 Nov 00; FBIS-NES-2000-1127, via World News 
Connection) 
 
The existing Caspian Sea legal regime is based, in part, on the 1921 Treaty of 
Friendship between the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic and Iran, and the 1940 
Soviet-Iranian Trade and Navigation Agreement, which do not reflect the new 
geopolitical realities in the region. Nor do they reflect, necessarily, subsequent 
developments in international law concerning bodies of water encompassed by 
several littoral states. The 1921 and 1940 treaties uphold joint ownership of the 
Caspian Sea by Iran and the former Soviet Union. Some countries, particularly 
Azerbaijan, argue the Caspian should be considered as a sea and divided into 
national sectors. In the past Russia has joined Iran in maintaining that the 
Caspian Sea should be treated as a lake (on the ground that it has no outlet to 
another sea or ocean) and therefore should not come under the 1982 United 
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. If considered as a sea, all the 
international laws of the sea apply and the oil-rich Caspian would be split into 
national sectors. If treated as a lake, however, the Caspian must be shared 
jointly by the bordering states. 
 
Azerbaijan, partner in the US-backed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey, takes a 
negative view of the consolidated Iranian-Turkmen position on the Caspian Sea 
legal regime. Baku has claimed that, under international law, the Caspian Sea 
must be divided into national sectors and has a lot to gain from exploiting its 
energy resources. (IRNA, 0800 GMT, 18 Oct 00; FBIS-NES-2000-1018, via 
World News Connection) Iran, however, penetrated Azerbaijan's territorial waters 
and airspace in August after Azerbaijani border troops had set up two signal 
buoys along the maritime border between Azerbaijan and Iran, demonstrating 
Iran's response to the idea of "dividing the Caspian into national sectors." 
(VREMYA NOVOSTI, 3 Aug 00; via The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press) 
Azerbaijan has been concerned about an adversarial "triangle" consisting of Iran, 
Russia and Armenia. Russia provides security guarantees to Armenia by treaty, 
as well as supplying it with a billion dollars worth of Russian arms, while Tehran 
has given extensive political, military and economic support to Yerevan and 
continues to expand its relations with Armenia. (JANE'S INTELLIGENCE 
REVIEW, 1 Apr 98) By making concessions to Russia on the regime governing 
the water surface, i.e., navigation, Azerbaijan might be able to obtain the more 
important division of the sea bed. This would put to rest doubts about 
Azerbaijan's right to develop energy reserves in its sector of the Caspian Sea. 
Since Russia already has a bilateral treaty with Kazakhstan, a similar agreement 
with Azerbaijan would go a long way towards defining the de facto status of the 
sea -- without the participation of Turkmenistan and Iran. 
 
However, even in this case there are contradictions between the Turkmen and 
the Iranian positions. The Turkmen president recently called for the United 
Nations to broker a settlement if the littoral states were unable to reach an 
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agreement on how to divide possession in the Caspian Sea, stating, "The UN 
can set up a commission composed of its own specialists." Turkmenistan has laid 
claim to putative energy sources on the demarcation line between the Azerbaijani 
and Turkmen sectors, as well as having made specious claims on several oil 
wells that are well within the Azerbaijani sector. Turkmenistan hopes that the 
international mediation would postpone the development of the wells, if not 
actually grant Turkmenistan rights to the disputed areas. While the proposal for 
UN mediation met with limited interest on the part of some countries, Iran 
strongly opposed UN intervention in what it considers to be a "purely regional 
issue." (IRAN NEWS, 1135 GMT, 7 Mar 00; FBIS-NES-2000-1001, via World 
News Connection) Russia and Iran are opposed to third-party intervention in the 
Caspian Basin, an area Russia still claims to be part of its "sphere of influence." 
At the same time Russia and Iran seek to block Western influence and 
development of energy reserves in the Caspian region. Neither country wishes to 
see Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan emerge as an independent energy supplier. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Baltic 'unity' dissolves over NATO assembly resolution 
The grouping of the three Baltic states in all NATO enlargement discussions 
ended with a bang (and a few whimpers) at the alliance's Berlin meeting on 21 
November. A resolution submitted by US Senator William Roth (R-Delaware) 
specifically recommended one Baltic country -- Lithuania -- along with Slovenia 
and Slovakia for admission to NATO in 2002. The surprise move caused an 
unsurprising reaction: uproar from the other two Baltic countries, with a little help 
from their friends. Turkey and Norway each proposed amendments to the 
resolution. Turkey suggested including mention of all the countries that were 
named as potential candidates in 1999, thereby including Estonia and Latvia. 
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Norway proposed replacing "Lithuania" with "the Baltics." (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE, 21 Nov 00; via lexis-nexis) Neither amendment passed. 
The resolution that was accepted by the assembly did not name specific 
countries. Meanwhile, the fallout in Baltic relations continues. Lithuanian 
politicians have blamed the Estonian delegation for involvement in the move to 
remove Lithuania's name from the resolution. "Mentioning Lithuania in the 
document would have strengthened Estonia's position, as well," said Gediminas 
Kirkilas, a member of the Lithuanian delegation. While describing Estonia's 
position as "strange," Kirkilas lauded Latvia's "correct and constructive" position 
during the debates that mention of one Baltic state was better than none. (BNS, 
1324 GMT, 22 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1122, via World News Connection) 
 
Latvian delegation member Aleksandras Kirsteins, however, cast a shadow over 
Lithuania's sunny assumption of wholehearted Latvian support for the resolution. 
While explaining that he understood the attractiveness of mentioning only one 
state in order to weaken Russia's objections over NATO enlargement, Kirsteins 
told reporters that Latvia believes depicting one Baltic state as more ready that 
the others is groundless, given the military cooperation ventures the three 
countries are pursuing. (BNS, 1028 GMT, 23 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1123, via 
World News Connection) 
 
Meanwhile, Peeter Olesk, who headed the Estonian delegation to the assembly, 
rejected Lithuania's accusation of complicity. "The initiator of the amendment was 
Turkey and no member of the Estonian delegation helped Turkey in making the 
amendment," Olesk said. "Turkey proceeded in its proposal from the words of 
NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, according to which it is still too 
early now to bring out any separate candidate at the expense of others." (BNS, 
0954 GMT, 23 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1123, via World News Connection) 
This is not the first time that the somewhat artificial grouping of the three Baltic 
states has shown weaknesses. Similar squabbling was seen three years ago 
when Estonia was listed on the fast track for EU membership, as a result of 
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Estonia's clear lead in stabilizing its post-Soviet economy. At that time, Lithuania 
and Latvia reacted negatively. Yet that action by the EU has acted to spur the 
other two countries to pursue more actively economic stability and to align their 
policies with EU standards, thereby making them more attractive applicants for 
membership. 
 
In the military/security sphere, however, there are no clear leaders among the 
three states, and the results of the NATO parliamentary assembly meeting 
highlight a potential problem facing the Baltic countries. Despite extreme 
differences in outlook, domestic situations and foreign relations, the very small 
Baltic states will continue to be considered as a unit by much of the international 
community. When that unit shows substantial cracks in its foundation, it 
undermines perceptions of stability in a self-defeating cycle that can then 
diminish its attractiveness to external security structures and, so, diminish its own 
security. Such sibling rivalry as was evident during the parliamentary assembly 
meeting demonstrates that the three countries, unwisely, are ignoring the very 
real issue that the Baltic states are in this together -- whether they like it or not. 
Meanwhile, in a move no doubt designed to assuage Estonian and Latvian 
concerns (and, perhaps, dampen Russia's hopes) that they are to be left on 
NATO's sidelines, alliance officials spent some time in the Baltic states, offering 
soothing words and promises. Lt. Gen. David S. Weisman, the US military 
representative in NATO, met with Estonian Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik 
Ilves in Tallinn on 29 November, and promised to support Estonia's bid for 
membership in the alliance. The general acknowledged the progress Estonia has 
made toward meeting NATO requirements. (BNS, 0836 GMT, 30 Nov 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1130, via World News Connection) NATO Secretary-General George 
Robertson visited Riga during the same week, and praised Latvia's membership 
action plan for NATO. (BNS, 1226 GMT, 28 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1128, via 
World News Connection) 
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And, in a move that startled absolutely no one, Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov warned that "Russia thinks that NATO's enlargement is a mistake, as it 
leads to the creation of several security spheres and undermines the foundations 
of European security and stability." In case that was too subtle, he added his 
hope that "common sense will triumph in the Baltic countries and in Brussels, and 
events will not develop according to a dangerous scenario." (INTERFAX, 1126 
GMT, 22 Nov 00; FBIS-EEU-2000-1122, via World News Connection) 
 
LATVIA 
Are the National Bolsheviks still coming? 
Officials apparently have stopped the threat of an "invasion" of Russian 
extremists, despite a claim by group member Aijo Beness that 20 more National 
Bolsheviks have entered the country and are "angry and ready to do anything." In 
an interview with the newspaper Chas, Beness threatened possible occupation of 
municipal buildings in Riga or the abduction of Latvians in Russia (for exchanges 
of his detained comrades). Beness was unconcerned about the potential 
repercussions of such statements: "I have already been in prison for 
delinquency." (LETA, 0748 GMT, 21 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1121, via World 
News Connection) What a surprise. 
 
Alas, one thing Beness clearly did not learn during his time in jail was the all-
important how-to-stay-out-of-prison lesson. Security police have detained him 
due to the threats he made, and Vladimir Moskovtsev, the leader of the group's 
Latvian branch, for involvement in the National Bolsheviks' recent claim to fame. 
(BNS, 0855 GMT, 24 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1124, via World News 
Connection) Their fellow Bolsheviks face criminal prosecution over the "capture" 
of St. Peter's church in Riga. Dmitri Gafarov, Maksim Shurkin and Sergei Solovev 
were charged with terrorism and illegal border crossing, and could be sentenced 
up to life imprisonment. (BNS, 1407 GMT, 29 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1129, via 
World News Connection) And that's not all, if some members of parliament have 
their way. Although considered to be relatively powerless, the organization 
 21 
should be legally liquidated, according to Andrejs Pantelejevs, chairman of the 
Saeima National Security commission. (LETA, 1441 GMT, 22 Nov 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1122, via World News Connection) 
 
The National Bolsheviks group isn't the only haven for disaffected young men 
with violent tendencies, either. A group calling itself Latvia's Young Communists 
has claimed responsibility for the blasting of a railway branch in Riga. The 
group's demands include the release of Mikhail Farbtukh and former Soviet 
partisan Vasily Kononov, the cessation of criminal prosecution against anti-
fascists and former Soviet employees, the legalization of activities of the 
communist party, and the institution of Russian as a state language. "Our blasts 
will have no victims but the world's community should know we are fighting for 
democratic freedoms which are banned for us in Latvia," the group said in a letter 
to the newspaper Diena. Clearly unable to see the irony in demanding 
"democratic freedom," the Young Communists may indeed represent the same 
group that called itself Fighters of Democratic Latvia, which had claimed 
responsibility for a similar blast on a railway branch line in June and had issued a 
similar set of demands. (BNS, 1106 GMT, 25 Nov 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1125, via 
World News Connection) 
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